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F&G Annuities & Life, Inc.’s insurance subsidiaries help customers save for retirement, receive retirement income and obtain life insurance coverage. Retail annuities account for most sales and reach customers through independent agents, banks and broker-dealers. Its most popular products are fixed indexed annuities: customers receive principal protection and credits linked to a market index, subject to contractual limits rather than the index’s full return.
F&G invests customers’ money mainly in fixed-income assets and uses derivatives to fund index-linked credits. It earns a spread when investment returns exceed the cost of promised benefits and operating expenses. Pension plans also pay it an upfront premium to take over future pension payments, while institutional clients provide money under funding agreements in exchange for agreed future payments. These businesses use the same investment-spread model. F&G also earns fees from reinsurance arrangements, life insurance and its owned distribution businesses.
Earnings depend on the returns from invested assets and the cost and timing of policy payments. Blackstone ISG-I Advisors LLC manages most of the investment portfolio, and contractual commitments substantially limit F&G’s ability to replace it. Insurance capital requirements constrain how much business subsidiaries can write. The parent company relies on subsidiary distributions for cash, and insurance laws limit those distributions.
The risk section is the longest, dullest part of the filing. This keeps only what can really hurt you: where it hits, how hard, when it plays out.
Every company claims an edge. Each one is checked against hard numbers like margins and returns: which hold, and which line gives way first.
Corebridge Financial and F&G both sell retirement annuities and insurance solutions to institutions, making the gap between investment returns and promised payments central to both companies’ earnings. Watch Corebridge’s spread income: it accounted for 60% of its combined spread income, fee income and underwriting margin in 2025.
Fidelity National Financial owns and consolidates F&G, so F&G’s annuity and life insurance results feed into its parent’s earnings rather than compete with them. Look at FNF’s F&G segment, not its property-title insurance business, for results from retail policyholders and institutional retirement clients.
F&G relies on Blackstone to select investments and source assets that help it earn more than it pays on insurance obligations; Blackstone receives fees for managing those assets. At December 31, 2025, Blackstone’s BIS managed about 78% of F&G’s $69 billion investment portfolio, making its asset-sourcing capabilities especially important to F&G’s spreads.
Prudential Financial competes with F&G for individuals buying retirement annuities and companies paying an insurer to take over pension payments. Watch Prudential’s pricing and execution of pension deals, especially large transactions, against F&G’s focus on deals of up to $500 million and selective pursuit of larger retiree buyouts.
Jackson Financial competes with F&G for buyers of fixed, indexed and registered index-linked annuities, and for institutions paying upfront for future payments under funding agreements. Its heavier focus on variable annuities makes those overlapping products more useful to watch than Jackson’s overall annuity results.
Lincoln National competes with F&G for individuals buying annuities and life insurance, including index-linked retirement products. Those buyers are the clearest overlap to watch in Lincoln’s business.
Brighthouse Financial and F&G compete for U.S. customers buying retirement annuities and life insurance through independent sellers. Watch Brighthouse’s annuity and life business through those distribution partners for a view of the market F&G also serves.
Aegon’s Transamerica business competes with F&G for U.S. customers buying indexed annuities and indexed universal life insurance through agent networks. That product-and-distribution overlap matters more for F&G than Aegon’s wider international business.
CNO Financial Group and F&G compete for annuity and individual life insurance buyers, and both depend on investment returns exceeding interest paid to annuity holders and the cost of funding index-linked credits. Watch CNO’s annuity spread—the investment income left after those costs—for a comparison with F&G’s earnings economics.
Equitable Holdings competes with F&G for individual retirement annuity buyers, particularly in registered index-linked annuities. Keep that competition separate from Equitable’s substantial asset-management business when comparing the two.
MetLife competes with F&G for companies paying an insurer to take over pension payments and institutions paying upfront for future payments under funding agreements. Those transactions are the relevant overlap, rather than MetLife’s much broader international and employee-benefits businesses.
Blackstone Inc. earningsBX
Blackstone’s report offers a read on the investment platform that sources assets for F&G; its BIS unit manages about 78% of F&G’s investment portfolio.
Look at Blackstone’s asset-management and investment activity for evidence that its platform is still sourcing and managing assets. That speaks to the asset-sourcing backdrop F&G relies on, not to F&G’s investment returns. Stronger activity would support the pool of assets BIS can select; weaker activity would make that source less reassuring. F&G’s fees to BIS are based on assets managed, not directly on investment returns. The conclusion is whether Blackstone’s platform supports F&G’s access to assets, not whether F&G earned a higher return.
Fed Interest Rate Decision
For F&G, the Fed’s rate decision signals whether borrowing costs and returns on the fixed-income investments backing its annuity promises may rise or fall, affecting investment income, policyholder crediting costs and the cost of meeting withdrawals.
Expected4.0%Last release4.0%
If it comes in above expectations
If rates rise more than expected, F&G may need to raise crediting rates on annuities before its investment returns catch up; if policyholders withdraw, selling investments to meet payments could also lock in losses.
If it comes in below expectations
If rates fall more than expected, F&G’s investment returns may weaken while the value of its annuity obligations rises, squeezing the spread between what its assets earn and what it owes policyholders.
CNO Financial Group, Inc. earningsCNO
CNO Financial Group’s report will show how another annuity and individual-life competitor’s investment spread is holding up, offering a read on the market F&G also competes in.
Read CNO’s annuity spread—the investment income left after the costs of policyholder credits—alongside its annuity sales. A steady or wider spread with sales holding up would show that this competitor can sustain both in the annuity market; a narrowing spread would signal pressure between investment income and policy costs that F&G should also watch. The companies have different products and portfolios, so CNO’s result does not establish F&G’s. The conclusion is whether the market supports annuity sales and spreads together, not whether F&G will match CNO.
Prudential Financial, Inc. earningsPRU
Prudential Financial’s report will show how it competes for pension risk-transfer deals, especially large ones, a direct point of comparison for F&G’s selective pursuit of bigger retiree buyouts.
Look at the size and execution of Prudential’s pension risk-transfer deals, including whether it completes large transactions. In these deals, an insurer takes on pension payment obligations in exchange for a premium from the company. Continued large deals would show that F&G may face a capable rival when it selectively pursues bigger retiree buyouts; weaker large-deal activity would offer less evidence of that competitive pressure. Deal size alone does not show that pricing is attractive, and specific pricing may not be disclosed. The conclusion is whether large transactions have a strong competitor, not whether F&G will win a deal or earn more.
F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. earningsThis company
F&G earns from the gap between investment income and amounts credited or paid to policyholders, and this report will show whether asset growth and product sales are still turning that gap into earnings.
Read core sales—indexed annuities, indexed universal life and pension risk-transfer business—alongside investment income and adjusted net earnings, the company’s measure that excludes certain items. Steady core sales with investment income and adjusted earnings holding up would show that both policy sales and investment spreads are contributing; weaker core sales or earnings that fail to keep pace with assets and investment income would show that growth is not translating into stronger profitability. The conclusion is whether F&G’s core sales and investment spreads can support earnings together.