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Affiliated Managers Group (AMG) owns stakes in investment firms it calls Affiliates, whose managers retain substantial ownership and day-to-day control. These firms manage money for institutional and wealth clients across private markets, liquid alternatives, and stock and bond strategies. AMG supplies growth capital and helps them develop products, reach clients and plan management succession.
Clients pay the Affiliates mainly according to the assets they manage; some strategies also charge fees when investment returns exceed specified thresholds. AMG receives an agreed share of this income. Firms that supply most of its consolidated revenue allocate AMG a share of revenue before operating expenses, generally with priority over additional distributions to their managers. Other partnerships give AMG a share after agreed expenses, so their costs also affect what AMG earns.
The business depends on Affiliates retaining client assets, delivering investment results and maintaining their fee rates. The mix of strategies matters because fees differ across investments, and performance fees vary between periods. Many clients can end management contracts on short notice, while mutual-fund contracts need annual board approval. Certain changes in AMG’s ownership can also require client consent to keep management agreements in place.
The risk section is the longest, dullest part of the filing. This keeps only what can really hurt you: where it hits, how hard, when it plays out.
Every company claims an edge. Each one is checked against hard numbers like margins and returns: which hold, and which line gives way first.
Virtus Investment Partners competes with AMG for retail and institutional clients through independently branded, autonomous managers, with both groups helping those managers sell their investments. Virtus’s retail separate-account and institutional assets show where this rival is building the client base that pays asset-based fees.
Victory Capital Holdings, Inc. competes with AMG through autonomous investment businesses managing clients’ equity, fixed-income and multi-asset portfolios, supported by shared sales platforms. Its assets in these strategies are the relevant comparison for AMG, rather than the size of its platform alone.
Franklin Templeton competes with AMG through specialist managers for client assets, with both earning management fees tied to the money they manage. Watch Franklin’s asset mix as well as its total assets: different investment categories carry different fee rates.
Blue Owl Capital Inc. challenges AMG on two fronts: attracting investors’ money into alternative strategies and buying equity stakes in independent investment managers through its GP Strategic Capital business.
ARTISAN PARTNERS ASSET MANAGEMENT INC. competes with AMG’s long-only managers for clients seeking distinctive, actively managed investments, using autonomous investment teams. Watch whether Artisan closes or limits strategies to protect investment capacity: its asset growth can be deliberately restrained rather than simply reflect client demand.
Invesco competes with AMG’s managers for clients’ active equity, balanced and alternative portfolios, where the mix of assets shapes management-fee revenue. Invesco earns higher fees on these products than on fixed income, money market, stable value accounts and ETFs, so total asset growth alone misses the revenue picture.
AllianceBernstein Holding, L.P. competes with AMG’s managers for institutional, retail and private-wealth clients seeking actively managed investments. Watch its mutual funds and tailored private-wealth portfolios: clients can generally end these arrangements at any time or on short notice.
GCM Grosvenor Inc. competes with AMG’s alternative managers for clients investing in private markets and strategies seeking absolute returns, through funds and customized accounts. Its customized accounts held 71% of assets at December 31, 2025, making that business the clearest place to watch this rival’s client demand.
Blackstone competes with AMG’s alternative managers for investor capital that produces management fees and a share of investment gains. Watch Blackstone’s income from realized fund gains, known as carried interest: AMG also looks to its private-market managers’ ability to realize these gains for long-term earnings growth.
Ares Management Corporation competes with AMG’s alternative managers for institutional and wealth clients’ investment capital. Its fundraising through intermediaries is worth watching alongside direct institutional commitments, because AMG is also building distribution for alternative products in the U.S. wealth market.
The Carlyle Group competes with AMG’s private-market managers for investors’ commitments to private equity and credit funds. Carlyle’s fundraising in those two businesses is the relevant activity to watch, since long-term capital commitments underpin AMG’s private-market earnings potential.
Brookfield Asset Management competes with AMG’s private-market managers for institutional and private-wealth capital, earning management fees and a share of investment profits from alternative funds. Watch capital raised for Brookfield’s long-term private funds, where client commitments support both fees and future profit-sharing income.
TPG competes with AMG’s private-market managers for investor commitments to private equity, credit and real-estate strategies. Watch commitments to successive funds in these businesses rather than total asset growth alone, since TPG’s growth also includes acquisitions.
Acadian Asset Management Inc. competes with AMG’s equity and liquid-alternative managers for institutional clients seeking differentiated investment strategies. Its business uses data and systematic research to manage institutional portfolios, making assets in that business the relevant comparison for this part of AMG.
BlackRock competes with AMG’s managers for active and private-market investments, while its index products offer investors another destination for their money. Watch how client assets divide between these offerings: both firms typically earn investment-management fees tied to assets, but AMG’s managers also face competition from passive products.
KKR & Co. Inc.’s asset-management business competes with AMG’s alternative managers for institutional and individual investors’ capital that earns management fees. KKR’s management-fee revenue is the closer comparison for AMG than group-wide results, which also include Insurance and Strategic Holdings.
Apollo Global Management’s asset-management business competes with AMG’s private-market managers for client capital that generates investment-management fees, but Apollo also has substantial retirement-services exposure. Watch earnings from asset-management fees after expenses—its Fee Related Earnings—rather than treating Apollo’s whole business as a match for AMG.
Blackstone Inc. earningsBX
Blackstone’s realized fund gains show whether private-market managers are turning investment gains into cash, a backdrop for performance-based fees at Affiliated Managers Group’s private-market managers.
Watch Blackstone’s realized carried interest: the manager’s share of fund investment gains when contractual conditions are met. More realized gains suggest exits are converting into proceeds and create a more favorable backdrop for performance fees at AMG’s private-market managers; less suggests a weaker backdrop, though it does not establish how AMG’s own funds performed.
ARTISAN PARTNERS ASSET MANAGEMENT INC. earningsAPAM
Artisan Partners Asset Management’s report shows whether its active managers are limiting strategy capacity, helping distinguish weak client demand from deliberate limits on taking in assets.
Read strategy closures or limits alongside asset growth in those strategies. If Artisan limits capacity and asset growth slows, the restraint is deliberate, not proof that clients have lost interest; if strategies remain open while assets are weak, softer demand is a stronger explanation and may mean tougher competition for AMG’s active managers.
Invesco LTD earningsIVZ
Invesco’s report shows which products are gaining assets at different fee rates, a useful read on how client asset mix can shape fee revenue at Affiliated Managers Group’s managers.
Compare Invesco’s asset growth in active equity, balanced and alternative products with growth in fixed income, money market and ETF products. More growth in the higher-fee categories points to a mix that can support fee revenue; growth concentrated in the others can lift total assets without a comparable increase in fees, the same mix effect that matters to AMG.
Ares Management Corporation earningsARES
Ares Management’s fundraising shows whether wealth-market intermediaries are bringing money into alternative strategies, a distribution channel Affiliated Managers Group is also building.
Compare capital raised through intermediaries with direct institutional commitments. Stronger intermediary fundraising would show that the wealth market is supplying alternative strategies and that AMG faces established competition as it builds this channel; weaker intermediary fundraising alongside stronger institutional commitments would mean growth still relies more on institutions.
Blue Owl Capital Inc. earningsOWL
Blue Owl Capital’s report shows its activity in raising alternative-investment capital and buying stakes in independent managers, where it competes with Affiliated Managers Group for partnership opportunities.
Separate Blue Owl’s fundraising for alternative strategies from its GP Strategic Capital investments in independent managers. Stronger fundraising means it is competing for the same kinds of alternative capital as AMG’s managers; more manager-stake activity means AMG may face stronger competition when seeking firms to partner with or invest in.
TPG Inc. earningsTPG
TPG’s fundraising for successive private-equity, credit and real-estate funds shows whether investors are still committing long-term capital to strategies that also support Affiliated Managers Group’s private-market managers.
Watch new commitments to TPG’s successive private-equity, credit and real-estate funds, not total asset growth that can also include acquisitions. More commitments show investors are still willing to place capital with private-market managers, supporting AMG’s ability to attract long-term fee-paying assets; fewer point to a harder fundraising environment and a weaker base for long-term fees.
Affiliated Managers Group earningsThis company
Affiliated Managers Group earns fees through its investment managers, so this report shows whether their assets and performance are translating into fees and earnings for the company.
Read average assets under management alongside aggregate fees, then check equity-method income and earnings attributable to AMG. If assets and fees rise and those company-level figures rise too, growth in assets and strategy mix is reaching AMG; if assets grow without lifting fees or earnings, fee rates, asset mix, performance fees or Affiliate expenses may be absorbing the benefit.
Apollo Global Management, Inc. earningsAPO
Apollo Global Management’s Fee Related Earnings show what its asset-management fees leave after related expenses, a peer read on how fee revenue converts into earnings at Affiliated Managers Group’s managers.
Watch Apollo’s Fee Related Earnings, not group-wide results that also include retirement services. Growth means its asset-management fees are leaving more earnings after related expenses, a favorable peer signal for how AMG’s managers convert fees; if fee revenue grows but this measure is weak, expenses may be absorbing part of the increase.
